

Understanding the Division Between Analytic and Continental Philosophy

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Abstract

The divide between Analytic and Continental philosophy has profoundly influenced contemporary philosophical discourse, offering distinct approaches to understand logic, language, science, culture, and human experience. Philosophy, hitherto divided into ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary stages, reflects this bifurcation in its contemporary phase. Given the groundwork laid by Frege's logic, Analytic Philosophy, propagated by people such as Russell and Wittgenstein, now deals exclusively with linguistic analysis, scientific strictness, and logical clarity. While on the other hand, Continental philosophy has stretched from Husserl's phenomenology through Heidegger, Sartre, and Derrida to emphasize existential, cultural, and subjective dimensions. This paper will outline the origin, key figures, and intellectual trajectories of these divisions, and discuss points of convergence, conflict, and transformation between them. While Analytic philosophy focuses on clarity and scientific explanation, Continental philosophy invests in much deeper questions of humanism, politics, and culture. Particular attention is given to the global significance of these traditions, especially their standing in South Asia, where postcolonial thought has fostered a unique integration. The research underlines their joint contribution to the enrichment of contemporary philosophy by investigating the historical and thematic interplay between two schools.

Keywords: Analytic Philosophy, Continental Philosophy, Division, Contemporary Philosophy

Introduction

From antiquity to the present, philosophy has always been dynamic: the interaction of ideas, methods, and cultural contexts. This dynamism best typifies the division in modern times between Analytic and Continental philosophy. This divergence in the early 20th century reflects diverging priorities, with Analytic philosophy developing out of a priority on the exactness of language and logical argumentation, mainly through Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein, and Continental philosophy out of more existential, cultural, and political concerns from the likes of Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre.

This separation has its roots in both intellectual and geographical causes: while analytic thought started to develop in the English-speaking countries, Continental traditions

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dominated Europe. In the course of time, this caused both intellectual debates, which made the enrichment of both traditions possible, and barriers in mutual understanding. The paper discusses the historical development, major contributions, and criticisms of these traditions, addressing their relevance in contemporary global and South Asian contexts.

Understanding the Background

Before the 20th century, the division between Analytic and Continental philosophy did not exist. This categorization began primarily in the mid-20th century [1]. To understand the roots of this division, it is essential to examine the works of Gottlob Frege [2] and Edmund Husserl [3]. Near the end of his career in 1929, Husserl remarked, "Of course, we still have a philosophical congress. Where philosophers meet is fine, but unfortunately philosophies do not meet. Philosophy today lacks a mental unity where it does not seem that they can depend on each other" [4]. This statement highlights the emerging fragmentation in philosophical discourse. Initially, there was no apparent conflict between Frege and Husserl. From 1884 to 1896, their philosophical trajectories aligned significantly, and both contributed to a transformation in philosophical methodologies. The two philosophers critically engaged with each other's work, exchanging ideas through correspondence. Frege's contributions laid the foundation for the analytic tradition, focusing on the mathematical and logical aspects of philosophy. His innovations in logical language and methodology gained attraction in English-speaking countries. Meanwhile, Husserl pioneered phenomenology [5], establishing a method that reshaped European philosophy by emphasizing subjective experience and consciousness. This divergence marked the beginning of two distinct paths in modern philosophy, with Frege influencing analytic philosophy and Husserl shaping Continental thought [6].

These developments reflect how their foundational work eventually diverged, contributing to the divide that would later characterize the philosophical landscape [7]. It can be assumed that this division later created two different currents of Analytic and Continental philosophy in the philosophical circles. Another context that will be relevant to discuss here is the development of British philosophy. In the second half of the 19th century, Hegelianism [8] spread in Britain, and at that time British philosophers such as T.H. Green and F.H. Bradley were influenced by Hegelianism. On the other hand, British philosophers Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore, influenced by Frege, started British Analytic philosophy. Frege rejects the idealism of the time in his discussion. Frege's rejection of the theory later influenced Russell and Moore. Husserl, on the other hand, was influenced by prophetic thought. Husserl, in his book *Cartesian Meditation*, discusses subjective philosophy in his review of Descartes' rationalism [9], while analytic thinkers capitalize on Frege's new logic and reject the past [10]. So, the analytic

philosophers were influenced by Frege and Russell; the genre took off in the 20th century with the work of philosophers such as Moore, Wittgenstein, Carnap, and Hempel. A school of philosophers that sought to analyze complex concepts and language through the use of symbolic logic, which we see in the philosophies of Russell, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, and Frege. A classic example of analytic philosophy is Russell's solution of the four puzzles [11] of philosophy of language, which began with Frege's philosophical discussions. As Analytic philosophy developed over time, this school began to criticize metaphysical discourses from various angles. Analytic philosophers mainly discuss intuition, common sense, logical positivism in scientific explanation [12], and the nature of language.

Continental philosophy, on the other hand, is primarily associated with European philosophers, especially in Germany and France, where philosophers were largely influenced by Husserl. Whereas analytical philosophers focus on language and logic, continental philosophers focus on their own philosophical methods and subjective interpretations. For example, Heidegger's *Being and Time*, Sartre's existentialist movement. The umbrella of Marxism, Deconstructionism, can be seen in Continental style. Analytic philosophy, on the other hand, focuses on collective experience, language and its morphological analysis, common sense, intuition [13], and direct principles of science. Continental philosophy mainly deals with subjective, transcendental, and absolute experiences, which take the discussion deeper. Another important point is that the terms analytic and continental were not discussed separately in the beginning as we use them today. In English-speaking academia during the 1960s and 1970s, European philosophy in particular was discussed under the Continental label. In 1962, the Analytic-Continental Divide became largely institutionalized. At that time, American continental philosophers formed their own organization called The Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP), while the organization of analytic philosophers was the American Philosophical Association (APA) [14].

Currents, Streams, and Patterns of These Two Divisions

Continental philosophy... is problematic. "Ask me what I'm working on, and I'll reply with the name of a problem," the Analytical Philosopher will proudly say, "ask them, and they'll reply with a proper name [15]."

The analytic philosophy started off very much as a movement closely allied to the Anglo-American tradition, which upheld realism and scientific rigors. It deliberately distanced itself from the European philosophical tradition in the desire for clarity, precision, and logical analysis. This early orientation privileged empirical methods and the application of formal logic to philosophical problems, defining its own identity against the more speculative and phenomenological approaches typical of Continental philosophy. With time, however, the borders that set analytic philosophy as a single movement have

dissolved, and in their place come a host of specialized branches reflecting a broader and more varied intellectual pursuit. The most important of these developments involves the formation of a separate field of language philosophy, one deeply influenced by Frege's writings on logic and semantics. His contributions formed one basis upon which many later philosophers developed positions that became seminal in debates about meaning, truth, and linguistic structure.

Apart from the emergence of the philosophy of language, other key turns that have occurred within analytic philosophy include shifts in their positions concerning science and ethics. The old normative perspective, obsessed with universality of standards and logic, has gradually been superseded by post-empiricist philosophies of science that focus on the contextual and dynamic aspects of scientific study. This runs in tandem with another development: the resurgence of normative ethics, resolutely concerned with questions pertaining to values and morals and their implication for contemporary social life. Analytic philosophy at one time dominated Anglo-American philosophical thought (which was pragmatic and scientific) as distinct from the European tradition. But in the current context, it no longer exists as a movement. Rather, a separate branch of philosophy of language and psychology [16] has now developed. Major changes have included a shift from normative perspectives to a post-empiricist philosophy of science and a revival of normative ethics. From Frege's philosophy, a separate branch of philosophy of language arose. The 1950s saw a fusion of logical positivism [17] with the philosophy of language and led to an empirical trend in which W.V. Quine [18], Richard Rorty played an early role, and later philosophers like Dummett and Davidson tried to transform analytic philosophy into a new form [19].

In the early decades of the 20th century, a serious intellectual confrontation between phenomenologists from Germany and analytic philosophers from Britain took place, focused mainly on the issue of logical positivism. It has become the doctrine of validating knowledge essentially through empirical science, conflicted directly with the metaphysical and more experience-based emphasis of phenomenology. This struggle mirrored more profound philosophical disagreements concerning the role and boundaries of science.

By the 1930s, the rivalry between Martin Heidegger, the main exponent of phenomenology, and Rudolf Carnap, the apostle of logical positivism, became a defining moment in the division between these two schools of thought. Carnap's rejection of metaphysics as meaningless and his focus on the logical analysis of language clashed directly with Heidegger's existential inquiry into being and the metaphysical underpinnings of human experience. The philosophical opposition here signifies something more profound-the crystallization of the divide between Continental and Analytic philosophy. It was also further emphasized as logical positivism became

influential in America. This adoption, however, was less about intrinsic philosophical differences and more to do with political and cultural contexts of the time. It was in tune with the cultural emphasis on scientific progress and empirical validation that logical positivism should be aligned with scientific rigor and dismissive of metaphysical speculation. Phenomenologists, by contrast, believed that while science is a strong method, it is nevertheless limited. They believed that science could describe physical and neural processes but could not capture subjective experiences, such as the way an individual feels pain or pleasure. This belief led phenomenologists to focus on metaphysics and the nature of human experience, which they saw as essential to understanding existence. Logical positivists, in contrast, rejected metaphysical discussions entirely, asserting that only empirical, scientifically verifiable statements held meaning. This fundamental divergence in perspective-phenomenology's preoccupation with subjective, existential questions, versus logical positivism's scientific empiricism-solidified the division between these two philosophical traditions.

According to Carnap, if philosophy and its idealistic theories are logically analyzed in the light of metaphysics, we will see that they are completely meaningless. Logical analysis can dismiss the core of metaphysics, which was not possible even from the earlier anti-metaphysical perspective [20]. According to Heidegger, on the other hand, science essentially wants to know nothing. But it is nevertheless certain that science needs nothing for help when it tries to express its essence. It clings to what it rejects. What incongruity then does science really reveal? [21] Derrida says of Carnap and Heidegger that the difference between Carnap and Heidegger regarding the nature of truth is clear. But this difference does not arise from a lack of attention to Carnap's philosophy of life. Rather, here too Carnap's and Heidegger's initial situation is compatible. Both experienced neo-Kantian doctrine [22] and philosophy of life in the early twentieth century. Originally central to this conflict were questions of reason and life, and it is here that their philosophical views are determined [23].

Back in the 1960s, philosophers such as Charles Sanders Peirce [24] and Ludwig Wittgenstein [25] tried to narrow the gap, influenced by Analytic thinkers such as the German philosophers Jürgen Habermas [26] and Carl Gustav Hempel [27]. But the philosophical disputes in Habermas vs Richard Rorty [28] and Searle [29] vs. Derrida [30] took analytic and Continental philosophy in a new direction.

Connection between These Two Divisions

In spite of the conflicts that prevailed in the two decades from 1930 to 1950, a significant advance in Analytic and Continental philosophy was observed. In Britain, Wittgenstein rejected preconceptions of philosophy in his *Tractatus (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus)*, introducing picture theory of language and meaning [31] and language games [32]. At the same time, J.L. Austin [33] wrote *How to do Things with Words*, a treatise on the

philosophy of language, which reflects the common usage and rules of language. Again, in Germany at that time, Husserl redeveloped his phenomenology with the crisis of European science, and through Heidegger's analysis of existence, a new school of Continental philosophy was transferred to hermeneutic ontology [34]. Later, Hans Gadamer [35] took this trajectory further, insisting that truth cannot be expressed in standard terms, but only in historical terms.

Since the 1970s, there has been a reciprocal rediscovery between American and European philosophers. In his essay *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*, Quine criticized the logical positivist trend of analytic philosophy, which later ushered in the post-analytic movement. This movement included thinkers such as Richard Rorty, MacIntyre, Bernstein, and Cavell, who attempted to integrate elements of Continental philosophy with American realism. On the other hand, Continental philosophers began to engage with the thought of analytic philosophy. Philosophers such as Ernst Tugendhat, Jürgen Habermas, and Paul Ricoeur advanced philosophical discussions of phenomenology and hermeneutics with useful materials from the Anglo-Saxon tradition. Pragmatism [36] has played an important role in both analytic and Continental philosophy. Clarence I. Lewis and Quine, key figures in American analytic philosophy, were influenced by pragmatism. Richard Rorty, as part of the post-analytic [37] genre, incorporated pragmatism into his philosophical framework, bridging ideas from both traditions. This shows that pragmatism has been crucial in facilitating the addition of analytic and Continental philosophical insights, creating a shared platform for dialogue and innovation [38].

However, how can we explain analytic and continental philosophy? The philosophers who are considered to have developed analytic philosophy—figures such as Bertrand Russell, Gottlob Frege, and Ludwig Wittgenstein—often came from varied academic disciplines other than philosophy in at least the formal or traditional sense. Russell's training was primarily mathematical, and his philosophical questions were deeply influenced by his mathematical background, particularly logical and foundational issues of mathematics. Frege was also a mathematician; his work on formal logic and philosophy of language provided one of the founding pivots of the analytic tradition. Wittgenstein came to the study of engineering first and then to philosophy via his work on logic and language with Russell as supervisor. This interdisciplinarity fostered a methodological emphasis in analytic philosophy on logical precision, empirical clarity, and scientific rigor.

The academic backgrounds of Continental philosophers often show a stronger connection to the humanities. Many of these thinkers came from disciplines such as literature, psychology, or traditional philosophy. For instance, Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, initially trained as a mathematician but later shifted to psychology and

philosophy, focusing on subjective experience and consciousness. Heidegger, drawing from classical philosophy and literature, emphasized existential and hermeneutic approaches. Similarly, figures like Sartre and Foucault were deeply influenced by literature and history, addressing themes such as humanism, cultural critique, and social analysis in their work. This divergence in academic origins shaped the methodological and thematic orientations of the two traditions: analytic philosophy leans toward formal analysis, logical structure, and empirical validation, while Continental philosophy emphasizes human existence, cultural narratives, and the historical context of knowledge. These differing foundations highlight the broader philosophical divide between the two traditions.

Distance and conflict between These Two Divisions

Analytic and Continental philosophers use geographical contexts (in Europe, especially Germany and France, as well as English-speaking countries) to determine distances. But Bernard Williams [39] says that determining distance or difference based on geographical location means that a car is either called four-wheeled or is said to be made in Japan. This becomes strange when we realize that the founders of Analytic philosophy (such as Frege and Carnap) were European, while many centers of "Continental" philosophy are in American universities, and that there are many Analytic philosophers who are not interested in the approach to Analytic philosophy [40].

After World War II, the philosophy of Jean Paul Sartre [41] and Marxist thought created a new current among the French and German intelligentsia that continues to the present. When discussing the background of Sartre's existentialist movement, Husserl and Heidegger inevitably come in, because the trend of Continental philosophy began with phenomenology and was shaped into an existentialist movement by Jean Paul Sartre. The intellectual circle in 1960s France is very important. At that time, Marxist thought began to be read anew and French philosopher Louis Althusser was the forerunner in this field. He brought Marxism to the forefront in a new way to understand the modern economic system, human alienation, and the complex relationship between the state and the market [42]. In addition, Claude Levi Strauss [43] and Roland Barthes [44] reinterpreted Ferdinand Saussure's [45] structuralism [46] by applying it to the understanding of anthropology, society, literature and culture. In the same contemporary context, Michel Foucault [47] and Jacques Derrida [48] created a new tide in Continental philosophy. Post-structuralism challenges universal knowledge, emphasizing how language, culture, and power shape and transform meaning. So, Derrida, Foucault, and Barthes influenced fields such as literary theory, cultural studies, and sociology. Post-structuralists explored society, power dynamics, and the construction of identity, language, and literature. Although Foucault did not label himself as a post-structuralist, his work on power deeply impacted Continental philosophy. This movement paved the way for postmodernism,

with Jean-François Lyotard as a foundational thinker. In his essay, *The Postmodern Condition* (1979) he discusses the relationship of postmodern society to knowledge and criticizes various metanarratives [49]. So where we see the triumph of universal truth in modern philosophy, it is mainly the place where postmodern thinkers strike. In Germany, on the other hand, the revolution of the 1960s was mainly associated with greater autonomy for the youth, anti-imperialist and anti-war activism, leftist politics in political revolts, and the rise of women's emancipation [50]. New philosophical movements emerged during this period, especially those of the Frankfurt School [51]. The intellectuals of the time argued for religious tolerance and the need for education for the lower classes. Individual autonomy and freedom from prejudice were the main discussions of these thinkers. In this way, Continental philosophy has its own distinctiveness.

On the other hand, this development of Continental philosophy has been harshly criticized by analytic philosophers. After the publication of Derrida's *"Of Grammatology"* (1967), he came to the interest of analytic philosophers. The essence of his deconstructionist theme is *"Il n'y pas hors-texte."* For Derrida, the interpretation and meaning of a text varies. Prominent 20th-century Analytic philosophers wrote a letter to *The Times* on May 9, 1992, against Continental philosophy. They criticized the relationship between Derrida and his philosophy. The paper was signed by 19 analytic philosophers, including Quine, David Armstrong, Barry Smith, Ruth Barcan Marcus, and René Thom [52]. Some of the discussions in the letter are as follows:

"Their influence has been almost entirely in fields outside philosophy." There is a strong implication here that the definition of philosophy has been collectively agreed upon: it coincides with the practices in "leading departments of philosophy throughout the world" (this designation remains in need of greater precision), which in turn determines "accepted standards of clarity and rigor." By not meeting these standards, Derrida is, according to this normative argument, not a proper philosopher. Similarly, since his recognition has not come from philosophers (that is, those recognized as philosophers by the contemporary institution of philosophy), an award for achievement in philosophy is not merited [53].

They criticized Derrida's style and style of writing, saying,

"M Derrida's career had its roots in the heady days of the 1960s and his writings continue to reveal their origins in that period. Many of them seem to consist in no small part of elaborate jokes and puns ('logical phallusies' and the like) and M Derrida seems to us to have come close to making a career out of what we regard as translating into the academic sphere tricks and gimmicks similar to those of the Dadaists or of the concrete poets [54]."

On the other hand, specialization is not observed by Continental philosophers, whereas analytic philosophers have divided philosophy into different parts (ethics and metaethics, psychology, philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology). Since Continental philosophers are not very interested in this specialized sub-branch of philosophy, they do not divide their discussion. When they start a discussion, on the one hand, they are making cultural or political criticism and at the same time bringing the explanation of language philosophy to their discussion. Continental philosophers approach political discussions in a way that many Analytic philosophers see as an undue effort [55]. Since Continental philosophers tend to engage with politics, they are more interested in political terms in discussions of knowledge, and thus conditioning knowledge is often irrational because they bring them into their discussions. This feature of Continental philosophy has been criticized by many Analytic philosophers, as they see it as a fallacy or genetic fallacy in the context of the discovery of justification [56]. The British philosopher Roger Scruton, in his book *Fools, Frauds, and Firebrands*, strongly criticized the writers of Continental philosophy. According to him, figures such as Sartre, Lacan, Habermas, Deleuze, Guattari, Althusser, Foucault, Edward Said, Badiou, and Slavoj Žižek may say many things, but they are, in reality, "*a nonsense machine*." He particularly criticized the post-structuralist thought developed by German and French intellectuals, arguing that it is as difficult to do justice to Foucault's achievements as it is to Sartre's. While Foucault developed theories, concepts, and insights with intellectual fluency, Scruton likened his synthetic style to "an eagle tumbling on clay," [57] and described it as vague, much like the works of left-wing writers [58]. He calls Lacan not only a hypocrite but an insane hypocrite [59], and to him Žižek is an overeducated global nuisance [60].

The stunning "nonsense machine" invented by Lacan, Deleuze, and Guattari; the scorched-earth attack on our "colonial" inheritance by Edward Said; and the recent revival of "the communist hypothesis" by Badiou and Žižek [61].

Analytic philosophers again criticize the anti-science stance in Continental philosophy. While most Continental philosophers engage with science and its development, they often do so only in terms of domination. David Copper argues that Continental thinkers have frequently objected to the dominance of science in modern culture, claiming that it does not represent the only form of knowledge, nor is it necessarily fundamental. They have treated scientific knowledge as secondary. This perspective originated with Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas, and was reshaped by the work of Lyotard and Foucault. On the other hand, the discussion of analytic philosophy is scientifically friendly [62]. Michael Dummett outlines analytic philosophy by arguing that the principal difference between analytic philosophy and other disciplines occurs due to its form of expression. First, there can only be philosophical thought by discussing language

within a philosophical framework. Second, there can only be philosophical inquiry by such means. [63].

However, Dummett's characterization is not entirely accurate. By the 1970s, analytic philosophy began incorporating discussions traditionally associated with Continental thought. Despite this, the core of analytic philosophy remains grounded in science, realism, and materialist thinking. In contrast, Continental philosophy focuses on humanism, literature, politics, and art. Prominent examples of this focus include Sartre's *What is Literature*, Deleuze and Guattari's *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature*, Foucault's *This Is Not a Pipe*, and Derrida's *The Truth in Painting*. Where science's central role in analytic philosophy is exemplified by Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Kuhn employs analytic methods to analyze the paradigmatic shifts in scientific thought, demonstrating how scientific inquiry itself evolves. This example highlights the philosophical divide: analytic philosophy positions science as a central pillar of inquiry, while Continental philosophy critically examines its limits, cultural dominance, and implications for understanding human existence.

Two Streams and South Asia

European and American philosophies have taken separate routes in the course of development. Analytic and Continental traditions continue to shape the philosophical landscape. The question thus arises: what trends are currently influencing the trends of thought in South Asia? If Bangladesh can be taken as a representative example, its philosophers do little other than fulfill the role of public intellectuals. So far as this is the case, it seems that Continental philosophy has not developed in the Subcontinent as it did in the West.

The coming together of Continental philosophy in South Asia occurred largely during the post-colonial phase when the region faced the legacies of colonialism. Their introduction in South Asia—phenomenology, existentialism, structuralism, and post-structuralism—continues to be identified with the interpretation of societies molded by colonial rule. These philosophical movements signify the postcolonial thought that has been imperative in understanding and critically perceiving the social, cultural, and political landscapes of post-independence South Asia. Thus, the universities of South Asia began adopting the stream of Continental philosophy, promoting the works of key philosophers such as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida. What probably makes Continental philosophy appealing in this context is that many of these philosophies have to do with direct politics and culture, issues that seemingly interested the intellectual climate in post-colonial South Asia. Their works dovetailed with the need to articulate identity, power, and the cultural struggles of the newly independent nation-states in the postcolonial wake of colonialism.

More importantly, the entry of Continental philosophy into South Asian academia enriched literature, sociology, political science, and cultural studies with its vast content. Coupling philosophy with these other disciplines served to expand the scope of South Asian intellectual inquiry within academia into an increasingly broad, interdisciplinary study of the complexities pervading postcolonial society. Whereas most significant philosophical contributions have often emerged from within Indian philosophy itself, the philosopher B.K. Motilal did try to link Indian philosophical traditions with analytic philosophy in substantive ways, especially in the fields of logic and linguistics. In his *Logic, Language and Reality: Indian Philosophy and Contemporary Issues*, Motilal sought to reconcile the logical strands of Indian philosophy with current issues of analytic philosophy. His work underlines one possibility of cross-cultural philosophic dialogue; namely, both the Continental and analytic traditions can be used for a deeper understanding of Indian thought and vice versa.

In the long run, Continental philosophy has taken much more time to take shape and flower in South Asia than its growth in Europe and America; yet, there is wholesome curiosity concerning these ideas in the postcolonial context. Such integration of Continental thought into local intellectual traditions continues to shape the philosophical landscape of South Asia by offering fresh perspectives on politics, culture, and identity. Meanwhile, people like Motilal prove that the gap between Indian philosophy and Western analytic philosophy can be bridged, each time opening more perspectives toward philosophical investigations in that region [64]. He analyzed the language and logic of different schools of Indian philosophy such as Neo-Nyaya Darshan, Avidya of Buddhist Philosophy, Yoga Philosophy and other schools of Indian philosophy. In addition, local philosophies such as Vedanta, Buddhism, and Sufism have created space for a dialogue between the traditions of Analytic philosophy and Continental philosophy.

The Present Condition of These Two Divisions

Among modern philosophers, principal cognitive personalities such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz had already laid a foundation for philosophical thought, while British philosophers-Locke, Hume, and Berkeley-often took things from a different perspective, usually in opposition to the Continentals. While these thinkers were important contributors to the development of modern philosophy, it was Immanuel Kant who really pushed philosophical thought to new heights and turned a corner in modern thought. Kant's work prepared the way for later philosophers like Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, each adding a new dimension to the evolution of philosophy. Finally comes perhaps the most extreme thinker after Hegel: Friedrich Nietzsche, who reacted not only to the dominant schools of philosophical thought. A critic of all schools of thought that preceded him, Nietzsche founded a school of thought called Nietzscheanism [65]. He promoted individualism, the will to power, and the negation of

traditional moral values. His thought would later give rise to some of the common themes in such modern schools of philosophical thinking, such as existentialism and postmodernism.

The philosophical questions asked by these thinkers have been a boon to philosophy, marking the grounds for modern thought. As the debate between idealism and realism further deepened, philosophy became increasingly torn apart, turning into two major streams in contemporary times: Continental philosophy and Analytic philosophy. This split between the two traditions was a reflection of the different approaches taken in describing the world: one more anchored in human experience, history, and culture. This division extends into contemporary times and molds current philosophical discourse, whereby each stream offers different insight into the nature of reality, knowledge, and existence.

Many philosophers believe that the Analytic and Continental streams are coming together at the present time, but the American Continental philosopher Graham Harman thinks that the Continental and Analytical division is not going to end soon. "Different philosophers offer different reasons, arguing that the division is ending," Harman said. Bruno Latour attempts to bridge this divide simply by claiming that Analytic philosophers can practice Continental philosophy better than professional Continental philosophers. There are philosophers of the Continental school who say that the division is ending, and this is considered by those philosophers who have found useful materials for their discussions in the work of analytic philosophers (such as Davidson, Kripke). In this case, Harman's own view is that the analytic/continental divide is very deep. Before the Analytic/Continental split began, Franz Brentano [66] gave an important lecture in Vienna in the 1890s on the phases in the history of philosophy, and he saw the future of philosophy more clearly than others at the time. Brentano said that philosophy, in a sense, is like a natural science, dealing with well-defined research and special advances on its problems, but in another sense philosophy is again like the visual art, which does not advance like science, but is established through periodic streams of maturity and decadence. This is the fundamental difference between analytic and continental philosophy. This division should not be brought together too quickly, since there is much important for us to learn from both streams. By making a philosophical distance from being a 'mere sociologist' or merely a geographical location, many forget that Vienna [67] is in Europe. The analytic/continental divide strikes very deeply at the double nature of truth. Instead of expecting the two approaches to merge, we can expect both to simultaneously replace something more extraordinary. But I don't have any predictions about when it might happen. It may end within the next decade, or the analytic/continental divide may be prolonged for several more centuries. But people are not taking this division and its consequences seriously [68].

On the other hand, German philosopher Markus Gabriel, who is considered the founder of new-realism, refuses to accept this division of philosophy. According to him, What philosophers do should be taken as 'philosophy' only, and so do I. The only tradition I like to follow is to happily accept this brand of 'philosophy'. I personally hate the idea or division between analytic and continental philosophy and I think this distinction is completely misguided. Analytic philosophy and continental philosophy express only philosophy, but the term philosophy is used pejoratively by many other groups. On the (European) continent, where I come from, you won't find a 'continental view' just like you won't find a 'continental breakfast' in Bonn - except in some tourist hotels. But still, 'analytical philosophy'; What exactly does it mean? So, I happily embrace only this brand of 'philosophy', I don't want to go beyond philosophy like Nietzsche or Heidegger, so in that sense I just stick to the tradition of philosophy [69].

Conclusion

The Analytic-Continental divide, once seen as an unbridgeable gulf, has gradually softened as philosophers from both traditions engage with each other's ideas. While their foundational differences—analytic precision versus Continental breadth—remain, the exchange of ideas has enriched modern philosophy. Pragmatism, hermeneutics, and post-structuralism exemplify areas where these streams converge, fostering innovative approaches to enduring philosophical questions.

The reception of these traditions in South Asia reflects unique postcolonial preoccupations, where Continental philosophy helps in critiquing cultural and political legacies, while Analytic philosophy refines logical and linguistic methodologies. As boundaries between these traditions continue to blur, their conversations hold out a prospect that philosophy will continue to function as an eclectic, pluralistic discipline capable of addressing the complexity of human experience.

Notes and References

[1] The contemporary period in the history of Western philosophy beginning at the early 20th century.

[2] German mathematician who later became a rationalist logician. He contributed to the development of modern mathematical logic and analytic philosophy. His work had a far-reaching impact on twentieth-century philosophy, especially in English-speaking countries.

[3] Austrian-German philosopher and he founded a philosophical approach called phenomenology, which later initiated the existentialist movement in philosophy.

[4] Sokolowski, R. (1987). Husserl and Frege. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 84(10), p528. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026913>

[5] Phenomenology is subjectively understanding the individual's own experiences and consciousness.

[6] Mohanty, J. N., Frege, G., & Husserl, E. G. (1974). Frege-Husserl Correspondence. *The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, 5(3), 83–95. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43154997>

[7] Chase, J. (2010). Frege and Husserl. In *Analytic versus Continental: Arguments on the Method and Value of Philosophy* (pp. 16–22). chapter, Acumen Publishing.

[8] Hegelian idealism asserts that existence is intrinsically tied to the mind, proposing that reality is shaped and comprehended through our mental processes. This world, therefore, is manifested as a construct of our consciousness.

[9] Rationalism posits that reason is the primary source of knowledge, emphasizing that truths about the world can be discovered through logical thinking and intellectual deduction, often independent of sensory experience.

[10] Humphries, R. (1999). Analytic and Continental: The Division in Philosophy. *The Monist*, 82(2), 253–277. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27903635>

[11] Frege's Puzzle: This puzzle deals with the principle of the transitivity of identity, also known as the principle of identity substitution.

The Problem of Propositional Attitude: This puzzle involves the challenge of accurately reporting the beliefs, desires, and other mental states of individuals.

The Puzzle of the Bald King of France: This puzzle is about how to interpret and evaluate statements about non-existent entities, such as "The present King of France is bald".

The Puzzle of the Negative Existential: This puzzle is similar to the third one, but it specifically deals with statements that deny the existence of something.

[12] Logical positivism, a philosophical movement that began in Vienna in the 1920s, holds the view that scientific knowledge is the only real knowledge and that all metaphysical discussion is meaningless.

[13] Intuition refers to the direct apprehension or immediate understanding of knowledge without reliance on reasoning, sensory perception, or any intermediary process. It is often described as a form of insight that emerges spontaneously and is self-evident to the individual.

[14] Gutting, G. (2012, February 20). Bridging the Analytic-Continental divide. *Opinionator*. <https://archive.nytimes.com/opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/bridging-the-analytic-continental-divide/>

[15] Mulligan, Kevin. 1991. "On the History of Continental Philosophy." *Topoi* 10, no. 2: 115-2

[16] Psychology, in its philosophical context, explores the nature of mental phenomena and functions, examining their relationship to the structure of existence. It addresses how mental processes, such as perception, thought, and emotion, are causally connected to the fundamental aspects of being.

[17] According to empirical logical positivists, verifiable and empirical knowledge has only true value.

[18] American logician and philosopher, considered an influential figure in Anglo-American philosophy in the latter half of the 20th century. In the 1950s, he developed a methodological philosophical approach that was naturalist, empiricist, and behaviorist.

[19] Cremaschi, Sergio. (2002). On Continental and Analytic Philosophy. 25. 51-80..

[20] Carnap, Rudolf, "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language," Logical Positivism, ed. A.J. Ayer, pp. 60-61.

[21] Heidegger, Martin (1988). "What is metaphysics?" p. 96.

[22] The Neo-Kantian doctrine, emerging in the late 19th century, sought to reinterpret and rejuvenate Immanuel Kant's ideas to address contemporary philosophical and scientific challenges. This movement placed a strong emphasis on epistemology, focusing on the conditions and frameworks of human knowledge. Prominent figures like Hermann Cohen emphasized the role of science and logic in reconstructing Kant's critical philosophy, while Wilhelm Windelband highlighted the distinction between the natural sciences (*Naturwissenschaften*) and the human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*), proposing unique methodologies for each. Neo-Kantianism bridged classical Kantian thought with modern cultural and scientific contexts, influencing philosophy, sociology, and psychology.

[23] Derrida, J. *Margins of Philosophy*, translated by Alan Bass, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982.

[24] American scientist, logician and philosopher who is famous for his work on the relations of logic and empiricism.

[25] Austrian philosopher, whose main contributions were to the philosophy of logic, mathematics, mind and language. His influence is vast and is considered one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century.

[26] The most important German philosopher of the second half of the twentieth century. A highly influential social and political thinker.

[27] A German philosopher, he specialized in the philosophy of language and was a proponent of communication theory. He developed a distinct philosophical approach known as "Transcendental Pragmatics".

[28] American Pragmatic philosopher and intellectual. He is famous for his wide criticism of modern concepts of philosophy.

[29] The American philosopher who is best known for his work in the philosophy of language – particularly speech act theory – and in psychology, his contributions to mind, body discussion are many.

[30] A French philosopher of the 20th century. In the second half of the 20th century, he was at the peak of fame among the world's leading thinkers. His introduced theory is called deconstruction. His thoughts and analysis are associated with postmodern philosophy and philosophical analysis is considered post-structuralist.

[31] In *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein states that a speech or sentence is meaningful only if it represents something in the world. These sentences basically work like pictures.

[32] According to Wittgenstein, language play is the use of language in specific contexts, governed by rules followed by users. Money arises from its practical application.

[33] J.L. Austin was a British philosopher known for developing the theory of speech acts, which examines how language functions in communication. His work in ordinary language philosophy emphasized the importance of everyday language use in understanding meaning and philosophy.

[34] Hermeneutics can be considered as the art of explanation. Friedrich Schleiermacher is considered to be the father of this genre. We can call this section in a short form - "The art of interpretation" i.e. a text can have many interpretations depending on the relationship between the understanding of the reader and the writer.

[35] The German philosopher who was influenced by the philosophical methods of Wilhelm Dilthey, Husserl and Heidegger.

[36] Pragmatism evaluates theories or beliefs based on their practical application, utility, and success in addressing real-world problems. Its primary proponents include Charles Sanders Peirce, who introduced the pragmatic maxim; William James, who popularized the philosophy with a focus on the practical consequences of ideas; and John Dewey, who applied pragmatism to education and social reform. Pragmatism shifts the focus from abstract principles to actionable outcomes, making it a philosophy grounded in practical utility.

[37] Post-analytic philosophy, also known post-philosophy, Richard Rorty uses the term. This genre is influenced by American pragmatism. The influence of Continental philosophy can be seen in the philosophers of the post-analytic genre.

[38] Cremaschi, Sergio. (2002)

[39] English philosopher, famous for writing on ancient and modern philosophy, ethics and the history of Western philosophy.

[40] Gutting, G. (2012, February 20).

[41] Jean-Paul Sartre was a French existentialist philosopher, playwright, litterateur and critic. His work had a profound influence on sociology, literary theory, postcolonial theory and literary research.

[42] Rendtorff, J. D. (2014). Marxism in French philosophy: From existence to structure and beyond. In *Ethical economy* (pp. 99–119). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8845-8_5

[43] French anthropologist and ethnographer whose work has played an important role in shaping the theoretical foundations of structuralist anthropology.

[44] French literary theorist, essayist, philosopher, critic and semiologist. Barthes ideas have influenced the development of many schools of theory in various areas of knowledge, such as structuralism, semiotics, social theory, design theory, anthropology, and post-structuralism. His widely read book is *Mythologies*.

[45] Swiss linguist, semiotician (one who works with signs) and philosopher. The ideas he gave laid the foundation for many important developments in both linguistics and semiotics in the twentieth century.

[46] Structuralism analyzes a phenomenon and identifies its underlying structure, such as language, myth, and social system. According to structuralism, human experience forms the meaning of something, which emphasizes relationships and norms between social elements.

[47] He was a French philosopher, historian, political activist and literary critic. Foucault's theories primarily address the relationship between power and knowledge and focus on how they are used as a form of social control through social institutions. He is the author of many important books including *Discipline and Punish*, *Madness and Civilization*, *History of Sexuality*, *The Order of Things*, *An Archaeology of Knowledge*.

[48] He was a French philosopher. His idea known as Deconstruction. His thoughts and analysis are associated with postmodern philosophy and the philosophical orientation is considered as post-structuralist work. Derrida identified the weaknesses, inconsistencies and inadequacies of structuralism in his various speeches and writings.

[49] The "metanarrative" (or "grand narrative") provides a comprehensive explanation of essentially historical, cultural, and social structures. Metanarrative is often seen as legitimacy by presenting certain power structures and ideologies as universal truths.

[50] Poiger, U. G. (2012). *Generations: the 'Revolutions' of the 1960s*. In Oxford University Press eBooks. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199237395.013.0028>

[51] The school was established in 1923 under the Institute for Social Research at the University of Goethe. Members of this school sought to create a theory of society that was the basis of Marxism and Hegelian philosophy. Members of this school have also used insights from psychoanalysis, sociology, existential philosophy, and other disciplines. In their discussions, basic Marxist concepts were used to analyze social relations within the capitalist economic system. Thinkers like Friedrich Pollock, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Erich Fromm, Bertolt Brecht, Herbert Marcuse were members of this school.

[52] Humphries, R. (1999). *Analytic and Continental: The Division in Philosophy*. *The Monist*, 82(2), 253-277. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27903635>

[53] *Ibid.*, 256

[54] *Ibid.*, 256

- [55] Levy, N. (2003). ANALYTIC AND CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY: EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENCES. *Metaphilosophy*, 34(3), 284–304. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24439383>
- [56] Ibid., 288
- [57] Scruton, R. (2016). *Fools, frauds and firebrands: Thinkers of the New Left*. Bloomsbury Publishing. P.108 (epub)
- [58] Ibid., 175 (epub)
- [59] Ibid., 254 (epub)
- [60] Ibid., 271-272 (epub)
- [61] Ibid., 5 (epub)
- [62] Cooper, D. E. (1994). Analytical and continental philosophy. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 94, 1-18.
- [63] Dummett, M. (1993). *Origins of analytical philosophy*. London: Duckworth. P.4
- [64] Matilal, B. K. (2008). *Logic, language and reality: Indian Philosophies and Contemporary Issues*. Motilal Banarsidass.
- [65] Nietzscheanism refers to Nietzsche's ideas, including: the critique of Christian morality, opposing life-denying values like humility; the will to power, the drive to enhance one's strength; the Übermensch (Superman), the ideal individual who creates their own values; nihilism, the belief in life's lack of inherent meaning, encouraging self-created purpose; and master-slave morality, contrasting strength-based "master" morality with humility-based "slave" morality. Nietzscheanism promotes individual freedom and self-creation.
- [66] German philosopher and psychoanalyst. His notable students were Husserl, Heidegger, Alexius Meinong and Freud. His discussions sparked new research in broad fields such as linguistics, logic, mathematics, and experimental psychology, and the School of Brentano was founded by a younger generation of philosophers.
- [67] Vienna is taken in the sense that the Vienna Circle, which was formed in Vienna, Austria in 1920, was led by philosophers of the analytic stream.
- [68] Eupjournalsblog. (2021, November 15). An Interview with Graham Harman. Edinburgh University Press Blog. <https://euppublishingblog.com/2015/09/10/an-interview-with-graham-harman/>
- [69] Philosophy Now. "Markus Gabriel | Issue 113 | Philosophy Now." Philosophy Now, philosophynow.org/issues/113/Markus_Gabriel#:~:text=I%20hate%20the%20idea%20of,pejorative%20term%20by%20another%20group.