Intuition pumping refers to the methodological practice, increasingly dominant in analytical-philosophy since the 1960s, of using thought experiments to elicit intuitive responses that are then treated as philosophical evidence or ‘data’. The term was coined by Daniel Dennett in response to John Searle’s Chinese Room argument.
The method of cases
The typical structure involves constructing a scenario (often a thought experiment involving counterfactual situations) and then asking whether certain terms ‘apply’ to the case. For example, a scenario might specify that a subject S has some belief p, acquired through certain means, and then ask: ‘Does S know that p?’ The intuitive responses to such questions are taken as data that can settle philosophical disputes or be fed into further reflection.
Rise of intuition-based philosophy
The use of intuition talk in analytic philosophy has exploded since the mid-20th century. In leading analytic journals, articles engaging in ‘intuition talk’ rose dramatically:
- The Philosophical Review: from 31.2% (1950s) to 86% (2000s)
- Mind: from 25.9% (1950s) to 67.2% (2000s)
- Noûs: from 46.7% (1967-1976) to 83.9% (2000s)
This represents a fundamental methodological shift. Where earlier movements like Cambridge analysis or the Vienna Circle were highly methodologically self-conscious, post-1945 analytic philosophy increasingly fell back on the ‘surprising methodology’ of relying on intuitions.
Classic examples
Gettier cases
Edmund Gettier’s 1963 paper challenged the ‘justified true belief’ (JTB) analysis of knowledge by presenting cases where conditions were met but, intuitively, the subject did not have knowledge. In one scenario, Smith believes the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket (based on evidence about Jones), but Smith himself unexpectedly gets the job and also has ten coins. Gettier appeals to the intuition that Smith does not ‘know’ the proposition, despite satisfying JTB conditions.
Frankfurt cases
Harry Frankfurt (1969) challenged the ‘principle of alternate possibilities’ by imagining Black, who wants Jones to do something and is prepared to intervene if necessary, but Jones does it on his own. Frankfurt claims the intuition that Jones is responsible even though he could not have done otherwise undermines the principle that moral responsibility requires the ability to have acted differently.
Twin Earth
Hilary Putnam’s Twin Earth (1973) imagined a planet identical to Earth except that ‘water’ is XYZ rather than H₂O. The intuition that ‘water’ means different things on each planet was meant to show that ‘meanings just ain’t in the head’.
Chinese Room
John Searle’s Chinese Room (1980) imagined someone in a room following instructions to answer questions in Chinese without understanding Chinese. The intuition that the person doesn’t understand Chinese was meant to refute ‘strong AI’ programmes.
Philosophical problems
Dogmatism
Reliance on intuitions represents a form of dogmatism—the antithesis of philosophy. To appeal to intuitions is to admit that explanation has run out, that there is no better support than ‘that’s what I (or we) think anyway’. As Michael Della Rocca argues, ‘the starting points in common sense are arbitrary’. Such arbitrariness underwrites intellectual conservatism.
The amorphous ‘we’
Intuition pumps almost always rely on an undefined ‘we’. The reader is co-opted into this ‘we’, freed of subjectivity. Where membership is made explicit, it’s typically ‘competent speakers of English’. But on what basis do analytic philosophers speak for all language users? What sort of social group unreflectively takes itself to speak for language users at large?
Contrast with productive thought experiments
Productive thought experiments—like those of Galileo, Einstein, Plato’s ring of Gyges, Descartes’s evil demon, or Strawson’s No-Space world—expand the philosophical imagination rather than constricting it. They drive philosophical exploration rather than settling questions by appeal to pre-existing beliefs.
Plato’s ring of Gyges, for instance, is not an intuition pump but a comparative analysis showing how different conceptions of justice lead to different predictions about behaviour. Descartes’s evil demon serves as background to a philosophical demonstration, not an appeal to intuition. Strawson’s No-Space world stretches imaginative capacities to test conceptual understanding rather than eliciting immediate intuitive responses.
Experimental philosophy
The ‘experimental philosophy’ movement arising in the 2000s modified the method by conducting surveys rather than pontificating on the basis of philosophers’ own intuitions. However, it retained the atomistic-referential conception of language and assumed audiences simply ‘grasp’ scenarios unproblematically.
Methodological bankruptcy
The reliance on intuitions, whether elicited from oneself or measured in surveys, represents methodological bankruptcy. Where ancestor movements of analytic philosophy were methodologically rigorous, contemporary analytic philosophy has fallen into ‘methodological free-fall’, caught between appeals to common sense and deference to natural science, with a failure to expand philosophical imagination.
Further reading
- Gettier, E. (1963). ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’, Analysis 23
- Frankfurt, H. (1969). ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’
- Dennett, D. (1980). ‘The Milk of Human Intentionality’, commentary on Searle
- Della Rocca, M. on the arbitrariness of common-sense starting points