Wittgenstein argues in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that language forms the boundary of cognition, where propositions picture facts and share a logical form with reality. He distinguishes between what can be said and what can only be shown, concluding that his own philosophical propositions are nonsensical elucidations that should be discarded after serving their purpose of clarification.
Though initially influenced by Russell’s logicism and theories on paradoxes and descriptions, Wittgenstein diverges by arguing that logic consists of tautologies and that philosophy is an activity of clarification rather than a source of knowledge. Russell maintained his commitment to scientific philosophy while Wittgenstein moved in a different direction.
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein abandons his earlier picture theory and argues that meaning derives from use within language-games and forms of life. He argues against essentialism, proposing that concepts share family resemblances rather than essential features. He further argues that private language is impossible because meaning requires public criteria.
Wittgenstein argues that philosophy should be therapeutic, dissolving conceptual confusions by examining how language functions in practice. He draws parallels between philosophy and psychoanalysis as therapeutic practices that bring hidden aspects to consciousness, though he remains sceptical of depth psychology’s emphasis on unconscious drives. He argues that we must examine language critically to prevent it from bewitching our intelligence.